ALGERIAN PATRIOTS - ENGLISH

A recent official letter from Morocco to UNESCO has reignited a simmering cultural dispute between Rabat and Algiers . In its correspondence, the Moroccan government denounces what it calls “inappropriate remarks” — including expressions such as “sons of Bousbir” and “Kingdom of Marrakech” — allegedly voiced by Algerian civil society during the evaluation of Morocco’s bid to inscribe the “Moroccan” Caftan on UNESCO’s Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage. Rabat accuses these actors of “political manipulation” and urges the organization to safeguard the integrity of its assessment process. Yet behind this diplomatic exchange lies a far deeper controversy: the origins of the Caftan and the legitimacy of Morocco’s claim to register it as part of its national heritage. Algerian civil society, highly active in heritage advocacy, views Rabat’s move as a blatant act of cultural appropriation — particularly since the Caftan was already recognized in 2012 by UNESCO as an ele...

Sometimes a project is so vast, so audacious, so gloriously out of proportion that it feels more like a legend than an engineering plan. The Nigeria–Morocco gas pipeline—recently dissected by the American consultancy North Africa Risk Consulting (NARCO) —is a textbook example. NARCO didn’t pull any punches, branding it a “pharaonic,” “useless,” and outright “white elephant” venture. In plain terms: colossal in cost, endless in scope, and almost certain to defy logic. TSGP vs. GAA: Logic Meets Imagination On one side stands Algeria’s Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP) —a focused, pragmatic project involving just three countries: Nigeria, Niger, and Algeria . Most of the infrastructure is already in place, and aside from the Niger segment, the route is relatively straightforward. On the other side, Morocco champions the Atlantic Africa Pipeline (GAA) —an ambitious line stretching across 11 coastal nations , winding north to Morocco before crossing into Europe. A marathon pipeline riddled ...

For years, Algeria ’s official discourse—both presidential and governmental—has upheld a clear and consistent position: the dispute is not with the Moroccan people , but with the regime that governs them . This principle sustains a deliberate distinction between societies and state apparatuses, in line with an Algerian diplomatic doctrine that favors solidarity among peoples and opposition to expansionist state policies , rather than to civil societies themselves. Yet the evolution of Moroccan social discourse —especially on social media and within certain opinion segments—today poses a significant analytical challenge: a substantial portion of hostile rhetoric directed at Algeria —insults, identity-based attacks, and talk of the “Eastern Sahara”—does not emanate from Moroccan officials, but from sizeable segments of Moroccan society itself. This reality compels a reassessment of the geopolitical wisdom of indefinitely maintaining the “people vs. regime” distinction in the Moroccan...

Rapid developments in the Maghreb reveal a major strategic shift in Morocco’s behavior —a shift that can only be interpreted through a deliberate logic of pressure, provocation, and the maximal expansion of its maneuvering space. This approach—marked by a posture of escalation, defiance, and a break with regional balances—dangerously brings the region closer to the specter of armed confrontation . While some persist in wrapping the crisis in a rigid diplomatic discourse , political and operational data indicate that a solution will not emerge before the moment of explosion; at best, it will be imposed by the consequences of conflict. 1. Morocco’s Transformation: From Defensive to Strategic Offensive Since 2020, Rabat has adopted an unprecedented offensive posture in regional history, structured around three main axes: Expanding external alliances , notably through security and military normalization with Israel , including sensitive arms contracts that have created an artificial...

Since the Algerian government resolved to revive the strategic Gara Djebilet mining project (1), Moroccan media—both official and unofficial—has hastened to seize upon the subject, invoking an alleged “historical right” of Morocco over this deposit. According to the narrative advanced by Rabat, King Hassan II purportedly accepted the demarcation of borders between Morocco and Algeria in exchange for a usufructuary right over the Gara Djebilet mine. Yet, the instruments duly signed and ratified by both States tell an entirely different story (2). This article will revisit that point in detail, with the aim of dismantling Moroccan propaganda designed for domestic consumption—propaganda intended to perpetuate the illusion of a return to a bygone grandeur… which, in truth, never existed. Before addressing Morocco’s assertions, let us first outline the Gara Djebilet mega-project: what does it entail? 1) The Gara Djebilet mega project in a nutshell: The Gara Djebilet mine, located in Algeria...

The announcement of the deployment of an Israeli industrial capability for drone manufacturing in Morocco marks a major turning point in the Maghreb’s military balance. This development raises a central question: how can Algeria respond to this technological upgrade by its western neighbor? Options do exist, and they fall within the framework of a Russo-Algerian military cooperation that continues to strengthen. A Changing Regional Context: The Drone Factor as a Power Multiplier Armed drones are no longer just a tactical tool: they have become a strategic instrument, capable of striking deep, saturating defenses, and reshaping operational doctrines. For Rabat, integrating Israeli know-how into local drone production paves the way for capacity autonomy and asymmetric projection in the latent conflict over Western Sahara. In response, Algiers could turn to Russia’s long-range drone sector, particularly systems like the “Geran-2” (known as Shahed-136 in Iran), whose effectiveness has b...

With the first two Su‑57E fifth‑generation fighters now declared on combat duty for a foreign customer widely assessed to be Algeria , the country has entered the stealth era with a micro‑fleet. The strategic value lies less in numbers than in the qualitative uplift : sensors‑centric reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and low‑observable penetration that multiply the combat power of Algeria’s robust 4/4+ generation backbone (Su‑30MKA, Su‑35, Su‑24M). Even in very small numbers, Su‑57s can act as “tactical mini‑AWACS” and SEAD/DEAD spearheads , reshaping the regional calculus against increasingly layered Moroccan ground‑based air defenses (HQ‑9B/FD‑2000B, Patriot PAC‑3) and reinforcing Algeria’s deterrence posture in the Mediterranean . 1) Algeria’s “Micro‑Fleet” of Su‑57: What Can Two Jets Change? At Dubai Airshow 2025 , UAC CEO Vadim Badekha publicly stated the first export Su‑57s are on combat duty , with the customer “satisfied.” While Moscow did not name the buyer, Algeria ...