ALGERIAN PATRIOTS - ENGLISH

The invasion of Ceuta, organized by the Moroccan regime, represented a genuine geopolitical earthquake. The episode surprised many observers and raised a fundamental question: why did Rabat choose to target Pedro Sánchez when he had arguably been its most valuable ally in Europe? Since coming to power, Sánchez had multiplied concessions in favor of Morocco. On the diplomatic front, he carried out a historic shift in Spain's position on Western Sahara, breaking with decades of diplomatic caution. Economically, bilateral relations reached record levels, with a growing presence of Spanish companies in Morocco and an unprecedented expansion of trade between the two countries. Moroccan citizens also benefited from a number of specific advantages, particularly in the areas of mobility and administrative cooperation. No other country on the southern shore of the Mediterranean received such favorable treatment from Madrid. And yet, despite all these advantages, Rabat chose confrontation. C...

To listen to certain narratives in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla appear as Spanish territories whose fate has already been sealed by geography: two European cities on African soil, surrounded by Moroccan territory and destined, sooner or later, to return to their natural environment. This interpretation possesses undeniable symbolic appeal. It resonates with national sentiment and is frequently reinforced by segments of the Moroccan media landscape. Yet, when examined through the lens of diplomacy and strategy, the picture becomes considerably more nuanced. For despite maintaining a longstanding historical claim, Morocco has never pursued a comprehensive international strategy aimed at changing the status of Ceuta and Melilla in a manner comparable to other priority foreign policy issues. In practice, Rabat preserves the claim while simultaneously cultivating a pragmatic and cooperative relationship with Madrid, grounded in mutual interests and strategic interdependence. A Claim More Symb...

A Spanish report, presented as a security study and later widely circulated in Moroccan and Israeli media, points to what it calls an "Algerian actor" as one of the main nodes behind the mass migration wave toward Ceuta on July 30 and 31. An Algerian author argues that this hypothesis does not withstand close scrutiny. It would be easy to dismiss this argument as mere self-defense. That is precisely why a simple rule should be followed: do not add any facts that are not contained in the document itself, and do not rely on assumptions or interpretations. Read the report as it is and judge it solely on its own content. That is more than sufficient, because the report ultimately undermines itself. A Document with a Security Intelligence Appearance The report runs to seventy pages and was prepared by a Spanish security analyst. It carries a closing date of August 2 and bears a title referring to a digital mobilization campaign linked to what it describes as the "attack and ...

The claim that Morocco does not serve as “Europe’s policeman” is difficult to reconcile with the facts. For more than a decade, the European Union has invested heavily in strengthening Morocco’s border-control capabilities, committing hundreds of millions of euros to migration management, with the overwhelming share directed toward security and surveillance mechanisms. These funds are neither accidental nor philanthropic. They form part of a clearly acknowledged strategy of externalizing European migration control, making Morocco one of the central pillars of the continent’s policy of containing migratory flows before they reach European borders. Rabat has thus become an indispensable partner in a system whose primary purpose is to keep migratory pressure at a distance from Europe itself. Algeria, by contrast, benefits from no comparable arrangement. It receives no European funding dedicated to border surveillance and has never agreed to delegate its migration policy to external intere...

The French refusal to align with a logic of long-term military engagement against Iran is neither ambiguous nor hesitant. It is part of a far broader geopolitical context, marked by a profound reconfiguration of power relations, growing uncertainty regarding the American stance, and the rise of systemic risks on a global scale. Three recent elements help to better understand the French position and, more broadly, the European one. 1. Contradictory signals from Washington: a weakened Western alliance For several months, Donald Trump has never concealed his distrust of traditional multilateral alliances. The issue of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO , or at the very least a major strategic disengagement, frequently reappears in his political discourse. This signal is far from trivial: it calls into question the very principle of automatic solidarity that has underpinned Euro‑Atlantic security since 1949. For Europeans, this hypothesis creates a dangerous equation: either align with a short‑te...

The interruption of gas flows for more than four days through the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (GME), operating in reverse mode from Spain to Morocco, was not a trivial technical incident. It was a moment of truth. Beginning on 21 March 2026, deliveries resumed only hesitantly, before grinding to a halt once more on 27 March—never rising above 30% of their nominal capacity. In its brevity, the episode nonetheless exposed the deeper structural fragilities underpinning Morocco’s energy architecture. A Supply Chain Under Strain For two brief days, on 25 and 26 March, gas volumes destined for Morocco peaked at roughly 833,000 cubic meters per day —before falling to zero again. This volatility mirrored a sharp contraction in liquefied natural gas (LNG) arrivals at Spanish terminals, particularly Huelva , a critical gateway for gas feeding the Moroccan system. Regasified volumes there slipped below the one‑million‑cubic‑meter mark, signalling a broader tightening of available supply across Sp...

The Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (GME) was never a mere technical installation. For a quarter of a century, it functioned as an energy bridge between Algeria, Morocco, and the Iberian Peninsula, demonstrating that a pipeline can continue to operate even when political relations deteriorate. Commissioned on November 1, 1996, the GME was conceived as early as 1990, built between 1993 and 1996, and continued to operate despite the closure of the Algerian–Moroccan land borders in 1994. What occurred in 2021, however, marked a true turning point : Algeria stopped treating gas as a so‑called “tool of cooperation” and restored it to what it has always fundamentally been—an instrument governed by cost, sovereignty, and deterrence . 1) The origins: a European project… with Morocco in a rent‑seeking position Initially, the GME served a clear objective: to transport Algerian gas to Spain and Portugal via Morocco and the Strait of Gibraltar. Stretching approximately 1,300 km, the pipeline was prese...

New York, April 16, 2025. In the solemn chamber of the United Nations Security Council, a man takes the floor. With composure, precision, and a measured gravitas, Staffan de Mistura , the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara, delivers a briefing that, according to several diplomats present, may well mark a turning point in the protracted Sahrawi dossier. This report comes at a highly charged moment: fifty years after Spain’s withdrawal from Western Sahara in 1975, the question of decolonization remains unresolved, frozen in a status quo that only a crisis—or a concerted international awakening—might shake loose. For the first time in a long while, such a shift now appears within reach. A Diplomatic Trilogy at the Core of the Report Three key messages emerge from De Mistura’s address—three pillars that reflect both the current posture of the United States and shifting power dynamics within the Security Council. 1. Toward “Genuine” Autonomy: A Call for Clari...

On August 23, 1957, a confidential CIA document was drafted, revealing crucial insights into French policy toward Algeria, then in the midst of its war of independence. Recently declassified, this document sheds new light on France’s intentions regarding the oil-rich Saharan regions and its post-independence strategies. Through diplomatic, economic, and geopolitical maneuvers, Paris sought to maintain its grip on this strategically vital territory. An Indispensable Algerian Sahara for France According to the document, France regarded the Algerian Sahara as a region of paramount importance—not only for its oil and gas resources but also for its strategic position in North Africa. With this in mind, Paris was determined to secure its control over the area at all costs, administratively detaching it from the rest of Algeria. This policy materialized in 1957 with the creation of two separate Saharan departments—an initiative designed to ensure that even in the event of Algerian independenc...