ALGERIAN PATRIOTS - ENGLISH

The decision by Mali to withdraw its recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) comes within the framework of a broader reshaping of geopolitical equilibria in the Sahel and North Africa. Far from being a mere symbolic diplomatic gesture, this decision reveals a redefinition of strategic alignments, rising tensions with the foundational principles of international law, and a set of internal contradictions likely to affect the coherence of Malian foreign policy. 1. A Break with Africa’s Normative Framework Since the post-independence period, Africa’s political architecture—first embodied by the Organization of African Unity and later by the African Union—has been built upon two fundamental pillars: the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism and the right of peoples to self-determination . As an entity recognized by the African Union, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic forms part of this historical framework. Any challenge to its recognition therefore doe...

It took just one official post on X — sober, documented, and diplomatic — to expose an embarrassing reality: whenever Algeria is mentioned, some Moroccans would rather deny history than read it . A few days ago, the United States Embassy in Algiers recalled, with evidence in hand, a basic historical fact: the 1795 Treaty of Peace and Amity , signed in Algiers, constitutes one of the oldest chapters in Algerian–American relations. This treaty exists, it is accessible, and it is archived. And yet, instead of a calm debate, a wave of comments emerged seeking to declare as “impossible” what the archives clearly attest. A significant share of the most aggressive reactions — largely stemming from a Moroccan controversy on social media — revolved around a repetitive slogan: “Algeria did not exist in 1795.” In other words: if the fact is inconvenient, deny the fact. If the document contradicts the narrative, accuse the document. This is the logic of rewriting history through incantation and s...

A document from the French intelligence services, dated December 16, 1957, reveals Morocco's expansionist ambitions toward Algeria during the Algerian War of Independence. This document sheds new light on the complex relationship between the two countries and partially contradicts the historical narrative taught in Algeria, which emphasizes Morocco's unconditional support for the Algerian revolution. In the official version of the Algerian War's history, as taught in Algerian schools, Morocco under King Mohammed V is portrayed as a steadfast ally in the struggle for Algerian independence. This narrative highlights the unity of the Moroccan and Algerian peoples in their fight against French colonialism. It is true that the Algerian revolutionaries initially saw their struggle as part of a broader Maghreb liberation movement (Tunisia – Algeria – Morocco). The attack on the Northern Constantine region in August 1955, for example, was carried out in response to the exile of the...

The interruption of gas flows for more than four days through the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (GME), operating in reverse mode from Spain to Morocco, was not a trivial technical incident. It was a moment of truth. Beginning on 21 March 2026, deliveries resumed only hesitantly, before grinding to a halt once more on 27 March—never rising above 30% of their nominal capacity. In its brevity, the episode nonetheless exposed the deeper structural fragilities underpinning Morocco’s energy architecture. A Supply Chain Under Strain For two brief days, on 25 and 26 March, gas volumes destined for Morocco peaked at roughly 833,000 cubic meters per day —before falling to zero again. This volatility mirrored a sharp contraction in liquefied natural gas (LNG) arrivals at Spanish terminals, particularly Huelva , a critical gateway for gas feeding the Moroccan system. Regasified volumes there slipped below the one‑million‑cubic‑meter mark, signalling a broader tightening of available supply across Sp...

The Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (GME) was never a mere technical installation. For a quarter of a century, it functioned as an energy bridge between Algeria, Morocco, and the Iberian Peninsula, demonstrating that a pipeline can continue to operate even when political relations deteriorate. Commissioned on November 1, 1996, the GME was conceived as early as 1990, built between 1993 and 1996, and continued to operate despite the closure of the Algerian–Moroccan land borders in 1994. What occurred in 2021, however, marked a true turning point : Algeria stopped treating gas as a so‑called “tool of cooperation” and restored it to what it has always fundamentally been—an instrument governed by cost, sovereignty, and deterrence . 1) The origins: a European project… with Morocco in a rent‑seeking position Initially, the GME served a clear objective: to transport Algerian gas to Spain and Portugal via Morocco and the Strait of Gibraltar. Stretching approximately 1,300 km, the pipeline was prese...

The decision of the Appeals Jury of the Confederation of African Football (CAF) to strip Senegal of a victory earned on the pitch and award the Africa Cup of Nations to Morocco by administrative decision (on a “green table”) appears, upon examination, vitiated by manifest illegality , devoid of any persuasive legal basis and, as such, destined for clear annulment by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). This is not a mere disagreement over interpretation, nor a debatable exercise of discretion. The reasoning adopted reflects a fundamental error in legal classification and collides head‑on with the core principles of sports law— legality, proportionality, legal certainty, and the stability of competitions . By persisting in such a logic, CAF risks opening an institutional breach whose consequences could be lasting—not only for the outcome of a tournament, but for the credibility of the continental sporting order itself. 1) A Regulatory Basis Invoked… but Misapplied In an attem...

For several decades, Morocco has made a clear strategic choice: to anchor its military and security doctrine within the Western system. Rabat has thus invested heavily in interoperability with NATO armies , multiplied military cooperation agreements with the United States and European powers, and, more recently, deepened its security and technological cooperation with Israel. This orientation was not merely a policy of military modernization. It rested on a fundamental strategic assumption: integration into the Western security architecture would offer Morocco a form of implicit protection in the event of a major crisis. However, recent geopolitical developments in the Middle East—particularly the tensions linked to the confrontation with Iran —have begun to shake this conviction in several regional capitals. The Gulf precedent: costly but limited alliances The Gulf monarchies have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in their strategic relations with the United States. They have...

The Violent Reshaping of Global Power Dynamics — Accelerated by the War Against Iran, the Washington–Madrid Rift, and Russia’s Threat to Cut Gas Supplies to Europe — Could Trigger a Severe Energy Shock for Morocco.  Behind diplomatic niceties lies a simple strategic reality: Morocco’s energy architecture rests on a fragile logistical device that depends almost entirely on Spain — a country whose priorities are now overwhelmingly redirected toward ensuring Europe’s energy security. I. The Breakdown of the Maghreb Gas System The current situation has its roots in the termination of the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (GME) contract in 2021. This 1,620‑kilometre pipeline historically carried Algerian gas to Spain via Morocco. When Algeria decided not to renew the transit agreement, Morocco suddenly lost direct access to Algerian gas. To compensate for this structural rupture, Rabat set up an unprecedented four‑step mechanism: Purchasing LNG on international markets Unloading in Spain’s re...