ALGERIAN PATRIOTS - ENGLISH

To listen to certain narratives in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla appear as Spanish territories whose fate has already been sealed by geography: two European cities on African soil, surrounded by Moroccan territory and destined, sooner or later, to return to their natural environment. This interpretation possesses undeniable symbolic appeal. It resonates with national sentiment and is frequently reinforced by segments of the Moroccan media landscape. Yet, when examined through the lens of diplomacy and strategy, the picture becomes considerably more nuanced. For despite maintaining a longstanding historical claim, Morocco has never pursued a comprehensive international strategy aimed at changing the status of Ceuta and Melilla in a manner comparable to other priority foreign policy issues. In practice, Rabat preserves the claim while simultaneously cultivating a pragmatic and cooperative relationship with Madrid, grounded in mutual interests and strategic interdependence. A Claim More Symb...

A document from the French intelligence services, dated December 16, 1957, reveals Morocco's expansionist ambitions toward Algeria during the Algerian War of Independence. This document sheds new light on the complex relationship between the two countries and partially contradicts the historical narrative taught in Algeria, which emphasizes Morocco's unconditional support for the Algerian revolution. In the official version of the Algerian War's history, as taught in Algerian schools, Morocco under King Mohammed V is portrayed as a steadfast ally in the struggle for Algerian independence. This narrative highlights the unity of the Moroccan and Algerian peoples in their fight against French colonialism. It is true that the Algerian revolutionaries initially saw their struggle as part of a broader Maghreb liberation movement (Tunisia – Algeria – Morocco). The attack on the Northern Constantine region in August 1955, for example, was carried out in response to the exile of the...

A Spanish report, presented as a security study and later widely circulated in Moroccan and Israeli media, points to what it calls an "Algerian actor" as one of the main nodes behind the mass migration wave toward Ceuta on July 30 and 31. An Algerian author argues that this hypothesis does not withstand close scrutiny. It would be easy to dismiss this argument as mere self-defense. That is precisely why a simple rule should be followed: do not add any facts that are not contained in the document itself, and do not rely on assumptions or interpretations. Read the report as it is and judge it solely on its own content. That is more than sufficient, because the report ultimately undermines itself. A Document with a Security Intelligence Appearance The report runs to seventy pages and was prepared by a Spanish security analyst. It carries a closing date of August 2 and bears a title referring to a digital mobilization campaign linked to what it describes as the "attack and ...

The claim that Morocco does not serve as “Europe’s policeman” is difficult to reconcile with the facts. For more than a decade, the European Union has invested heavily in strengthening Morocco’s border-control capabilities, committing hundreds of millions of euros to migration management, with the overwhelming share directed toward security and surveillance mechanisms. These funds are neither accidental nor philanthropic. They form part of a clearly acknowledged strategy of externalizing European migration control, making Morocco one of the central pillars of the continent’s policy of containing migratory flows before they reach European borders. Rabat has thus become an indispensable partner in a system whose primary purpose is to keep migratory pressure at a distance from Europe itself. Algeria, by contrast, benefits from no comparable arrangement. It receives no European funding dedicated to border surveillance and has never agreed to delegate its migration policy to external intere...

Some coincidences, through sheer repetition, stop being coincidences. This Thursday, July 30th, on Morocco's Throne Day, several hundred migrants forced their way into Ceuta by swimming across the border, leaving at least nine dead and forcing Madrid to deploy military reinforcements. On paper, a tragic incident among many others on a border that has been under strain since the start of the year. In practice, the episode comes exactly ten days after Pedro Sánchez's visit to Algiers, a trip designed to settle years of estrangement with Algeria — and perceived in Rabat as a genuine diplomatic provocation. I don't believe in the coincidence of calendars in foreign policy, least of all where Morocco and the migration question are concerned. Rabat has already shown, notably during the 2021 crisis, its ability to loosen or tighten the migratory tap according to its diplomatic interests. This isn't a theoretical hypothesis: it's a proven method, a language the Makhzen mast...

On July 20, 2026, the US Embassy in Algiers announced the opening of a sub-office of the FBI’s Legal Attaché (LEGAT) within its diplomatic mission. Far from an isolated gesture, this decision fits into a coherent sequence of events that, taken together, reveal its underlying logic and lend it legitimacy. 1. The timing owes nothing to chance Barely a month separates two announcements: on June 19, 2026, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Algeria from its grey list, twenty months after placing it there, following a compliance process that led to an overhaul of anti-money-laundering legislation and tighter know-your-customer rules in the banking sector. Then, on July 20, the FBI announced its return. This temporal proximity is no coincidence: Washington traditionally makes the redeployment of financial-investigation capabilities conditional on certification against international anti-money-laundering standards. In plain terms, the United States was waiting for a signal of ...