Su‑57 in Algeria: Stealth Pathfinders as Force Multipliers — A New Airpower Grammar for the Maghreb

With the first two Su‑57E fifth‑generation fighters now declared on combat duty for a foreign customer widely assessed to be Algeria, the country has entered the stealth era with a micro‑fleet. The strategic value lies less in numbers than in the qualitative uplift: sensors‑centric reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and low‑observable penetration that multiply the combat power of Algeria’s robust 4/4+ generation backbone (Su‑30MKA, Su‑35, Su‑24M). Even in very small numbers, Su‑57s can act as “tactical mini‑AWACS” and SEAD/DEAD spearheads, reshaping the regional calculus against increasingly layered Moroccan ground‑based air defenses (HQ‑9B/FD‑2000B, Patriot PAC‑3) and reinforcing Algeria’s deterrence posture in the Mediterranean.

1) Algeria’s “Micro‑Fleet” of Su‑57: What Can Two Jets Change?

At Dubai Airshow 2025, UAC CEO Vadim Badekha publicly stated the first export Su‑57s are on combat duty, with the customer “satisfied.” While Moscow did not name the buyer, Algeria had already claimed first‑customer status in February 2025, with pilots training in Russia and deliveries slated for this year. A two‑ship stealth flight will not change the mass of Algeria’s air arm overnight; however, fifth‑generation pathfinders can dramatically multiply a 4+/4th‑gen fleet by pushing sensor fusion, electronic attack, and survivable ISR forward of the force — exactly where Su‑30MKA/35 formations need it most.

2) The Algerian Backbone: Su‑30MKA Mass, Su‑35 Bridge, Su‑24M Strike

Algeria’s fighter backbone comprises 70+ Su‑30MKA multirole heavyweights ordered since 2006, integrating phased array radar, thrust‑vectoring, range, and payload — long a dominant African/Arab capability. In 2025, Su‑35 airframes (originally destined for Egypt) were observed operating at Aïn Beida/Oum Bouaghi, with satellite imagery corroborating arrival and re‑marking. The Su‑35 acquisition likely bridges Su‑57 production phases while sustaining mass and readiness; it also hints at commonality upgrades (AL‑41F‑1S engines/IRBIS‑E radar) for Su‑30MKA over time.

3) Su‑57 Sensor Architecture: Distributed AESA/L‑Band + EW = Networked Overmatch

The Su‑57’s N036 “Byelka” radar suite (MIRES Sh‑121) is distributed: a nose‑mounted X‑band AESA, two cheek‑mounted X‑band arrays, and two L‑band arrays in the wing leading edges. This multi‑aperture design extends angular coverage and mixes frequency bands to help counter low‑observable targets, while published figures (open sources) cite tracking up to 60 targets and engaging up to 16 in air‑to‑air, plus integration with L402 “Himalayas” ECM and IRST. For a force without a publicly acknowledged AEW&C in service, the Su‑57’s sensor‑centric footprint acts as a “forward ISR/C2 node”, cueing and protecting Su‑30/35 packages.

4) Concept of Employment: “Lead with Stealth, Orchestrate the Strike”

In a mixed formation, push Su‑57 ahead of the package to:

1. Map the EM battlespace (radars, datalinks, emitters),
2. Geolocate threats and C2 nodes,
3. Distribute fused tracks over secure links to Su‑30MKA/Su‑35,
4. Execute SEAD/DEAD (suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses),
5. “Kick down the door” for Su‑24M and stand‑off strikers.

This sensor‑led orchestration compresses decision cycles, reduces exposure of 4+/4th gen tails, and raises strike precision. It mirrors the broader trend seen in modern 5th‑gen employment where stealth assets front‑load ISR/EW, open corridors, and curate targets for legacy mass.

5) The AEW&C Gap: Why Su‑57’s “Tactical AWACS” Role Matters Now

Open‑source reporting over the past decade shows Algerian interest in AEW&C platforms (e.g., Embraer‑145 “Netra” style solutions, Gulfstream‑based concepts, and other foreign offerings), but no official in‑service declaration. Until a dedicated AEW&C enters service, Su‑57’s sensor‑fusion forward node partially substitutes the ISR/C2 function crucial for air‑battle management and SEAD campaign coordination. Over the medium term, a proper AEW&C remains the true multiplier for a 5th‑gen fleet.

6) Morocco’s IADS Strategy: HQ‑9B/FD‑2000B and Patriot PAC‑3 Testing

Unable (for now) to field an equivalently capable 4+/5th‑gen fighter mass, Morocco has invested heavily in ground‑based air defenses. Reports and satellite imagery indicate operational HQ‑9B/FD‑2000B batteries near Rabat, with Chinese state media references and Arab defense outlets corroborating deliveries/activation since 2022‑2025. In March 2025, multiple videos and defense observers reported Patriot (PAC‑3 MSE) launchers arriving for field tests and familiarization at the Salé air defense base, signaling progression toward formal acquisition.

7) Mediterranean & NATO Context: Lessons Since Libya 2011

The 2011 intervention in Libya and its enduring instability shaped Algeria’s deterrence doctrine: secure air denial capability, resilient C2, and precision strike options to prevent coercive fait‑accompli scenarios. A stealth micro‑fleet puts operational uncertainty onto adversaries: counter‑ISR, selective access denial, and calibrated strikes under EW cover. The Dubai Airshow messaging — “entered combat duty” — is as much strategic signaling as it is operational news.

8) Risks & Limits: Availability, Sanctions, Doctrine, and the Need for AEW&C

• Fleet size & availability: Two jets equal a “sharp” capability whose strategic impact depends on MRO robustness (engines/spares), crew proficiency, and secure datalinks. Open sources caution that contractual specifics (numbers/configs) are not fully public, warranting analytical prudence.
  

• AEW&C gap remains: Su‑57’s tactical AWACS role helps, but it is not a substitute for a dedicated airborne C2/ISR persistent architecture. A G550/GlobalEye/Embraer‑145‑class solution would lock in the 5th‑gen uplift.
  

• Adversary countermeasures: Modern IADS blend multi‑band radars, passive sensors, mobile redeployment, and distributed fire control. SEAD must be multi‑platform and continuous; Su‑57 helps open, but sustained DEAD/SEAD requires mass, persistence, and C2.
  
  

9) Technical Box — Su‑57’s N036 “Byelka” in Brief

• Distributed architecture: 1 nose X‑band AESA + 2 cheek X‑band arrays + 2 L‑band arrays in wing roots → wider angular coverage, IFF/EW synergy.
• Multi‑target handling: open sources cite tracking up to 60, engaging up to 16 air‑to‑air; 4 air‑to‑ground simultaneously.
• Sensor fusion: integrates ECM L402 “Himalayas”, IRST, and secure datalinks for multi‑sensor picture.
  

10) Strategic Outlook: Quality First — Quantity to Follow

Two Su‑57s will not tilt the Maghreb airpower balance by mass, but they change how superiority is built and fought: distributed sensing, EW disruption, corridor opening, and networked cueing for Su‑30/Su‑35. Against a fortifying Moroccan IADS, Algeria has injected uncertainty and penetration potential that favor its deterrence and freedom of action. The true step‑change will come with additional lots, an institutionalized 4+/5th‑gen doctrine, and AEW&C induction — together, these could re‑write the air map of the Maghreb.

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By Belgacem Merbah

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