Refuting Morocco’s Claims About Its Role in the Algerian War of Independence: Between Selective Memory and Political Instrumentalization
Relations between Algeria and Morocco during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) were far more complex than the romanticized narrative of “Maghrebian unity” often promoted in Moroccan historiography. A recent publication titled “The Algerian War of Liberation in the Moroccan Press: Aspects of Moroccan Support for the Algerian Struggle for Independence”, authored by Mustapha El Aïdi and Abdelilah Kenka, aims to portray Morocco as a key supporter of the Algerian Revolution. However, this interpretation overlooks the historical realities, minimizes Morocco’s ambivalent and often opportunistic stance, and overstates the actual impact of its so-called support. This academic article responds point by point to the claims made in that publication, relying on Algerian, French, and international sources, as well as testimonies from leaders of the Algerian Revolution.
1. The Moroccan Press: Symbolic Sympathy or Opportunistic Coverage?
The publication argues that Moroccan newspapers such as Al-‘Alam and At-Tahrir acted as platforms for the Algerian Revolution by highlighting its victories and denouncing French colonial atrocities. While it’s true that certain Moroccan outlets expressed sympathy, this was often sporadic, inconsistent, and driven more by domestic political competition and ideological positioning than by structured or coordinated support for the FLN (National Liberation Front).
Moreover, this media coverage rarely translated into concrete action or state-level support. Unlike Egypt’s press under Nasser or Tunisia’s proactive diplomatic and logistical backing, Moroccan coverage remained mostly rhetorical and detached from the real dynamics of the struggle.
2. Moroccan Territory: Rear Base or Diplomatic Bargaining Chip?
The authors assert that eastern Morocco served as a “rear base” for the Algerian revolutionaries. In truth, the use of Moroccan territory by FLN units was tolerated inconsistently and often restricted. Unlike Tunisia, which provided the FLN with solid and stable logistical and diplomatic support, Morocco’s post-independence stance (after 1956) was marked by hesitation and political calculation.
Notably, in 1958, Moroccan authorities cooperated with the French in handing over Algerian fighters—a historical betrayal that the FLN never forgot. This event, known as the “Betrayal of El Ayoun,” remains a stark example of Morocco’s unreliability and prioritization of its own geopolitical interests over solidarity with the Algerian people.
3. Diplomatic Support: Genuine Advocacy or Political Bartering?
The book suggests that Morocco championed the Algerian cause on the international stage. Yet Morocco delayed official recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA) until late 1958—long after many Asian and African countries had already done so. This delay was rooted in Morocco’s reluctance to fully endorse the FLN as the sole legitimate representative of the Algerian people, fearing that such a move would harm its own bilateral negotiations with France.
Indeed, according to diplomatic archives and scholars such as Benjamin Stora, King Mohammed V sought to link his supposed support for Algeria’s independence to French concessions on territorial claims—particularly over the regions of Tindouf and Béchar in the Algerian Sahara. Far from altruism, this was pure geopolitical leverage.
4. The Myth of a “Common Struggle”: Post-Independence Invention
One of the most misleading claims in the Moroccan narrative is the existence of a “joint struggle” between Algerians and Moroccans against French colonialism. In reality, relations between the FLN and the Moroccan monarchy were marked by mutual distrust. Morocco even attempted to sponsor rival Algerian factions in order to counter the FLN’s dominance and promote interlocutors more aligned with Moroccan ambitions.
These underlying tensions culminated in the 1963 “Sand War,” when Morocco launched a military offensive against newly independent Algeria in an attempt to seize parts of its southern territory. This war shattered any illusion of a shared anti-colonial brotherhood and exposed Morocco’s irredentist agenda.
5. Instrumentalizing Memory: A Call for Honest, Not Selective, Research
The Moroccan book ends with an appeal to researchers to explore this period as a basis for “Maghrebian unity” and youth education. Yet this appeal rings hollow if it is built upon selective memory, national myth-making, and the erasure of uncomfortable truths. A sincere historical reconciliation must start with facts, not with glorified and self-serving narratives.
Algerians remember their war as a solitary and costly endeavor, carried primarily by their own people, and supported by truly committed allies like Tunisia, Egypt, and socialist countries. Morocco’s contribution, where it existed, was marginal and often double-edged—offering momentary help with one hand while negotiating with the colonial power behind closed doors with the other.
Conclusion
The Moroccan effort to rewrite history and cast itself as a decisive player in Algeria’s independence is a politically motivated attempt to gain moral leverage in today’s regional dynamics. Against such distortions, it is the duty of Algerian and Maghrebian scholars to uphold the integrity of historical inquiry, to reject ideological falsifications, and to preserve the memory of a Revolution that triumphed not because of Morocco’s help, but in spite of its ambivalence.
By Belgacem Merbah
Comments
Post a Comment