Towards an energy shock in Morocco? Dependence on American LNG and the risk of a Spanish blockade

The Violent Reshaping of Global Power Dynamics — Accelerated by the War Against Iran, the Washington–Madrid Rift, and Russia’s Threat to Cut Gas Supplies to Europe — Could Trigger a Severe Energy Shock for Morocco. 

Behind diplomatic niceties lies a simple strategic reality: Morocco’s energy architecture rests on a fragile logistical device that depends almost entirely on Spain — a country whose priorities are now overwhelmingly redirected toward ensuring Europe’s energy security.

I. The Breakdown of the Maghreb Gas System

The current situation has its roots in the termination of the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (GME) contract in 2021. This 1,620‑kilometre pipeline historically carried Algerian gas to Spain via Morocco.

When Algeria decided not to renew the transit agreement, Morocco suddenly lost direct access to Algerian gas. To compensate for this structural rupture, Rabat set up an unprecedented four‑step mechanism:

1. Purchasing LNG on international markets
2. Unloading in Spain’s regasification terminals
3. Regasifying on Spanish soil
4. Sending the gas back to Morocco through the GME in reverse flow

Since 2022, this system has become the kingdom’s main gas supply route. Imports exceeded 10,000 GWh in 2025, confirming Morocco’s growing dependence on infrastructures it does not control.

II. An Indirect Dependence on U.S. LNG

The uniqueness of this mechanism lies in the fact that Spain is one of Europe’s main importers of American LNG. The United States has become a major supplier to the Spanish gas market, at times overtaking historical exporters.

The gas flowing into Morocco is therefore often U.S. LNG, simply regasified in Spain before being re-exported. Morocco’s energy chain rests on three critical links:

Link	Actor	Risk
1 — Supply	International market (U.S. LNG)	Price volatility, trade sanctions
2 — Regasification	Spanish terminals	Madrid’s political decisions
3 — Transport	GME in reverse flow	Flow disruptions, shared infrastructure

A failure in any one of these links could destabilize Morocco’s entire energy system.

III. Russia’s Announcement: A Shockwave for Europe’s Energy Security

NEW ELEMENT — On 4 March 2026, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia could immediately halt gas exports to Europe in favour of markets deemed more profitable. This declaration fundamentally alters the continent’s energy equation.

In an interview with state television, Putin said it might be “more profitable to stop supplying the European market immediately” and shift to other buyers. This comes amid double pressure:

• the EU adopted in January 2026 a regulation banning Russian gas imports from 18 March 2026, and

• Asia — driven by the escalation in the Middle East — is offering Moscow premium prices.

Regulatory momentum reinforces the rupture: the European Parliament approved the gradual phase‑out of Russian LNG starting in 2026 and pipeline gas by September 2027. Russia’s share of EU gas imports fell from 45% in 2021 to 19% in 2024. Whether voluntary or imposed, a Russian withdrawal leaves a massive supply gap.

IV. Spain: Europe’s Energy Pivot — No Longer Morocco’s

In this new landscape, Spain’s position becomes strategically decisive. With seven regasification terminals — Europe’s largest network — the Iberian Peninsula alone accounts for one‑third of the EU+UK regasification capacity and 44% of EU LNG storage capacity (Gas Infrastructure Europe).

Faced with the vacuum left by Russian gas, Spain is expected to become the LNG hub of the entire European continent. The European Commission explicitly supports this ambition. Pedro Sánchez has stated that Spain already covers 37% of Europe’s regasification capacity.

Country	Share of EU Regasification Capacity	Strategic Role
Spain	~37%	Principal LNG hub, continental pivot
France	~15%	Secondary transit toward Central Europe
Netherlands	~13%	Northern European distribution
Italy	~10%	Eastern Mediterranean gateway
Morocco	0%	Total dependence on Spain

Under this new paradigm, Spain must absorb structurally higher European demand. Germany, Hungary, and other highly exposed states will put intense pressure on Spanish terminals. These capacities, while the largest in Europe, are not infinite.

Spain thus finds itself torn between two incompatible demands: Europe’s existential need and Morocco’s daily dependence.

V. The Washington–Madrid Crisis: A New Layer of Instability

The situation is further complicated by the crisis between Washington and Madrid. Donald Trump has threatened to suspend trade relations with Spain following Madrid’s refusal to allow U.S. use of Spanish bases in the war against Iran.

If these threats were enacted, the consequences for U.S. LNG flows to Spain would be immediate:

• Reduced American LNG exports to Spain

• Additional strain on terminals already overwhelmed by European demand

• Soaring prices in an increasingly compressed global market

Morocco, positioned at the end of this supply chain, would inevitably absorb the shock.

VI. The Worst‑Case Scenario for Morocco

Three simultaneous pressures create an unprecedented vulnerability for Rabat:

Risk Factor	Probability	Impact on Morocco
Russian withdrawal from European gas market	Very high (underway)	Massive European demand for Spanish terminals
Spain prioritizing Europe over Morocco	Very high	Reduced or suspended re‑exports to Morocco
Washington–Madrid commercial crisis	Medium to high	Less U.S. LNG available in Spain
Escalation in Middle East	High	Higher prices, tighter competition for LNG

Morocco could thus face the following paradox: Spanish terminals would operate at full capacity — but exclusively for Europe. Not out of hostility toward Rabat, but because national strategy and EU solidarity require it.

Direct consequences would include a sharp rise in electricity prices, difficulties supplying gas‑fired power plants, and a major risk of industrial slowdown.

VII. A Structurally Fragile Energy System

This situation highlights an overlooked strategic fact: Morocco still has no operational LNG terminal of its own. Several projects — including Nador West Med — were announced then suspended, delaying any path toward energy autonomy.

A state that externalises its energy security to a partner whose priorities can shift within weeks cannot claim sovereignty in this domain.

Conclusion

Morocco’s energy architecture is now trapped in a three‑sided geopolitical vise:

• Russia’s withdrawal, which mobilizes Spain for Europe,

• the Washington–Madrid crisis, which threatens American LNG flows, and

• Middle Eastern escalation, which tightens global markets.

Russia’s threat to immediately cut gas supplies to Europe fundamentally shifts the balance. Spain — until recently a convenient partner for Morocco’s reverse‑flow system — has, in mere weeks, become Europe’s central energy safeguard. It cannot simultaneously guarantee Morocco’s supply.

This raises a decisive strategic question:

Can Morocco sustainably ensure its energy security without a national LNG terminal in a world where its substitute supplier is required by all of Europe?

The answer goes far beyond energy policy. It exposes the fragility of a supply strategy built on stacked dependencies — Algerian, Spanish, American — in a world where geopolitical solidarities now operate at the scale of blocs, not neighbours.

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By Belgacem Merbah

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