Since the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2797, the Western Sahara file has entered a new phase—one marked less by legal progress than by an intensified battle of narratives. Morocco, supported by certain Western diplomatic circles, has sought to portray its autonomy plan as a definitive, irreversible solution endowed with international legitimacy. Yet a careful reading of the resolution, combined with a strict application of international law, reveals a far more sobering reality: the conflict remains legally unresolved, and Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara has never been established.
Official and unofficial accounts of the Madrid talks converge on a fundamental point often obscured by Moroccan discourse: the United States failed to impose the autonomy plan as the sole outcome of the negotiations. The Sahrawi side, backed by Algeria, maintained a firm and principled stance centered on the right to self-determination as the cornerstone of any just and lasting settlement, to be exercised through a free, fair, and genuine referendum. This steadfast position explains why the negotiations remain substantive and political in nature, rather than technical or procedural, as Moroccan propaganda repeatedly claims.
Resolution 2797 itself, frequently cited in a selective and instrumental manner, does not support the conclusions drawn by Rabat. While the resolution refers to the Moroccan autonomy proposal as a starting point for discussions, it deliberately refrains from defining the end point of the negotiating process. It neither recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara nor replaces or extinguishes the principle of self-determination. In diplomacy as in law, a starting point does not predetermine the final outcome, and any attempt to elevate Resolution 2797 into an act of legal consecration is a distortion of its meaning.
It is precisely here that the Moroccan autonomy plan reveals its most profound legal weakness. Autonomy, under international law, can only exist within the framework of a recognized and legitimate sovereignty. Morocco, however, holds no such sovereignty over Western Sahara. The territory has remained on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories since 1963, firmly situating it within the process of decolonization. Moreover, the International Court of Justice, in its 1975 advisory opinion, unequivocally affirmed the absence of any territorial sovereignty ties between Morocco and Western Sahara, while reaffirming the inalienable right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. This legal foundation has never been overturned.
Neither the United Nations nor the United States possesses the legal authority to confer sovereignty over a territory that does not belong to them. Sovereignty is not granted through political endorsements, diplomatic alignments, or resolutions shaped by power dynamics. It arises either from a valid legal title recognized by international law or from the freely expressed will of the people concerned. In the absence of either, the autonomy plan remains a unilateral political proposal, legally fragile and incapable of curing the original defect: the lack of lawful sovereignty.
Moroccan claims that “there is nothing left to negotiate” and that current talks are limited to technical modalities are therefore fundamentally misleading. If the issue had been settled in legal terms, negotiations would be unnecessary. The very continuation of the political process confirms that the core question remains unanswered: who holds legitimate sovereignty over Western Sahara? Until this question is resolved in accordance with international law, no autonomy arrangement—however well marketed—can bring the conflict to a close.
In conclusion, Resolution 2797 did not resolve the Western Sahara conflict, nor did it provide the Moroccan autonomy plan with the legal legitimacy it lacks. At most, it reshaped the diplomatic framework of discussion, offering Morocco a limited political advantage without altering the legal substance of the dispute. Western Sahara remains a territory awaiting decolonization, and the Sahrawi people retain an imprescriptible right to self-determination. Everything else belongs not to the realm of law, but to that of strategic communication.
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