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Between Sanctions and Strategic Realities: Algeria as a Pivotal U.S. Partner amid Russia’s Airpower Turn

At first glance, the renewed discussion surrounding potential U.S. sanctions against Algeria—triggered by reports of advanced Russian arms acquisitions—may suggest an approaching strategic rift between Algiers and Washington. A calm and rigorous reading, however, leads to a very different conclusion: the United States has neither the interest nor the strategic logic to destabilize Algeria, a cornerstone of North African security, a key stabilizing force in the Sahel, and a long-standing partner in counter-terrorism efforts.



It is within this broader strategic framework that recent developments concerning the Su-57 in Algeria and the export “rebound” of the Su-35 must be assessed—beyond headlines, through images, open-source intelligence, and the carefully calibrated messaging of major powers.

U.S. Sanctions: A Political Lever, Not a Strategy of Rupture

The CAATSA framework, routinely invoked whenever Russian arms deals are mentioned, functions primarily as a political deterrent tool, not as an automatic pathway to confrontation. Historical precedent is instructive: Washington has consistently applied CAATSA with significant flexibility, adjusting its implementation to the geopolitical weight and regional role of the country concerned.

Algeria is not a marginal actor. It is neither post-2013 Egypt nor Indonesia seeking transactional compromise. It is a sovereign strategic actor, endowed with decisive geographic depth and internationally recognized expertise in counter-terrorism against transnational jihadist networks. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Algerian-U.S. cooperation in intelligence sharing, border security, and the fight against AQIM and its offshoots has never been severed.

Washington may signal “concern” and issue warnings, but it is fully aware that seriously sanctioning Algeria would undermine one of the pillars of regional security, at a time when the Sahel is undergoing a dangerous and uncertain reconfiguration. Such a move would be strategically self-defeating.

The Su-57 in Algeria: Images, Signals, and Analytical Caution

In early February 2026, specialized platforms circulated video footage attributed to Algerian sources, presented as the first visual confirmation of Su-57 operations on Algerian soil. This came only weeks after a key statement by UAC CEO Vadim Badekha at the Dubai Airshow (November 2025), in which he confirmed that two Su-57E aircraft had been delivered to a foreign customer and placed into service, without naming the buyer.

The convergence of indicators is strong:
  • Algeria has long been considered the leading candidate to become the Su-57’s first foreign operator.
  • Algerian and Russian media had already reported, as early as February 2025, pilot training and deliveries before the end of 2025.
  • The circulated footage aligns with Algerian infrastructure, environment, and operational patterns.
That said, analytical discipline requires clarity: no official Algerian defense statement has yet explicitly confirmed Su-57 operations. The probability is high, but legal-formal confirmation remains absent. This caution strengthens—not weakens—the credibility of the assessment.

What the Su-57 Would Mean for Algeria’s Air Doctrine

Should the Su-57’s entry into service be confirmed, even in limited numbers, the impact would be doctrinal rather than numerical. The aircraft would assume a role once fulfilled by the MiG-25, but within a fifth-generation framework:
  • long-range interception,
  • information dominance,
  • penetration of contested airspace.
With its distributed AESA radar architecture (up to five antennas and simultaneous tracking of dozens of targets), the Su-57 would act as a force multiplier for the Su-30MKA and the Su-35—enabling tactical command, sensor fusion, and SEAD/DEAD coordination.

This advantage, however, hinges on three decisive variables:
  • sustainment and maintenance (MOC: maintenance in operational condition),
  • inter-generation data links,
  • and sustained access to long-range air-to-air and stand-off munitions.

The Su-35: Satellite Evidence of an Export Rebound

Unlike the Su-57, the presence of the Su-35 in Algerian service is no longer speculative. Satellite imagery from March 2025, supported by credible OSINT analysis, documented the transfer of an aircraft originally destined for Egypt—loaded at Komsomolsk-on-Amur and later observed at Aïn Beïda Air Base in Algerian Air Force markings.

This episode is strategically revealing. It demonstrates the flexibility of Russia’s defense supply chain, capable of redirecting aircraft blocked by CAATSA pressure toward sovereign customers. For Algeria, it represents a rapid and coherent enhancement of airpower within an existing operational ecosystem.


Washington Confronted with Reality: Managed Objection, Not Break

U.S. statements in February 2026 describing these acquisitions as “concerning” reflect a calibrated pressure narrative, not a strategy of rupture. Experience shows that Washington clearly distinguishes between dependent allies and autonomous strategic partners.
Algeria belongs to the latter category. It is neither aligned nor adversarial—it is indispensable.

In counter-terrorism, Sahelian stabilization, and Western Mediterranean security, no viable security architecture can bypass Algeria. This reality, more than any communiqué, constrains the practical reach of sanction threats.

Strategic Verdict

Stripped of media noise, several conclusions stand out:
  • U.S. sanctions remain a political pressure instrument, not a blueprint for confrontation with Algeria.
  • The likelihood of Su-57 operations in Algeria is high, though not yet officially confirmed.
  • The Su-35 is an established operational reality, supported by satellite and OSINT evidence.
  • Algeria remains a pivotal U.S. partner, not through alignment, but through strategic necessity.
In an increasingly fragmented international system, great powers must adapt to pivotal states. By virtue of its geography, security experience, and insistence on strategic sovereignty, Algeria clearly belongs to that category.

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