Western Sahara: Deconstructing Moroccan Propaganda Arguments and Reestablishing the International Legal Framework

A recurring media narrative today portrays Moroccan “autonomy” as the only “realistic” solution to the Western Sahara dispute, suggesting a decisive shift in international law and UN practice. This article, grounded in primary sources, demonstrates that the applicable legal framework remains unchanged: Western Sahara is still classified as a non-self-governing territory undergoing a decolonization process based on the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination. UN Security Council resolutions continue to call for a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution that ensures self-determination—without endorsing a single predetermined outcome. Recent European jurisprudence reaffirms the territory’s status as “separate and distinct” from Morocco and underscores the requirement of Sahrawi consent for any agreement affecting it. While some bilateral positions support the Moroccan initiative, they do not alter the binding nature of UN norms.

1. A Legal-Political Dispute Under UN Auspices

The status of Western Sahara rests on three legal pillars: the 1975 ICJ Advisory Opinion, the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, and the periodic resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly.

• The International Court of Justice found no ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and either Morocco or Mauritania, explicitly affirming the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination through decolonization (ICJ, Western Sahara, Oct. 16, 1975).
• Western Sahara has been on the UN list of non-self-governing territories since 1963 and is, by the UN’s own admission, the last decolonization issue in Africa.
• The General Assembly’s Fourth Committee annually reaffirms the Sahrawi people’s inalienable right to self-determination and the UN’s responsibility in this matter.

Partial conclusion: The notion of a “new legal realism” that limits the outcome to autonomy contradicts these foundational legal references.

2. What Security Council Resolutions Actually Say

Since 2007, the Security Council has renewed MINURSO’s mandate and called for a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution that ensures self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. Resolutions 2703 (2023) and 2756 (2024) extend MINURSO’s mandate and reiterate this language, while supporting the efforts of the Personal Envoy and encouraging cooperation with the OHCHR on human rights monitoring.

Two key points stand out:

• No resolution “endorses” autonomy as the sole path forward. The Council’s “appreciation” of “serious and credible” proposals does not equate to imposing a status or prejudging the outcome.
• The Council consistently reaffirms the roles of the parties (Morocco and the Polisario Front) and neighboring states (Algeria and Mauritania), emphasizing their shared responsibility in reviving the process.

3. MINURSO’s Mandate: A Referendum Still Matters

Established by Resolution 690 (1991), MINURSO was originally tasked with organizing a referendum in which the Sahrawi people would choose between independence and integration. Although the referendum has not taken place, the Mission’s official mandate still reflects this foundational purpose, alongside ceasefire monitoring, political support, and demining. Recent resolutions extend MINURSO’s presence to maintain de-escalation and support UN mediation—without altering the legal principle of self-determination.

4. “Internal Self-Determination”? Clarifying Legal Categories

The argument that contemporary international law favors “internal self-determination” (local governance under pre-established state sovereignty) must be contextualized. In decolonization scenarios involving non-self-governing territories, the prevailing rule remains freely expressed self-determination, including the option of independence. The 1975 ICJ opinion and UN decolonization practice confirm this. Reducing self-determination to mere administrative devolution distorts the norm in this specific context.

5. European Jurisprudence (2024): “Separate and Distinct Territory,” Consent Required

On October 4, 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) annulled the extension of EU-Morocco agreements to Western Sahara and its adjacent waters. The Court ruled that the territory is “separate and distinct” from Morocco under international law and that any agreement affecting it requires the consent of the Sahrawi people—not merely the consultation of a “population” that includes settlers. This ruling, grounded in the right to self-determination and the principle of treaty relativity, reinforces the territory’s international status and refutes the notion of Moroccan sovereignty enforceable erga omnes.

6. Bilateral Positions vs. Multilateral Framework: Distinguishing Politics from Law

Some states have expressed political support for the Moroccan initiative. In April 2025, the United States reaffirmed its 2020 recognition and described autonomy as the “sole basis” for discussions in its bilateral view. However, this position does not alter the UN legal framework: Security Council resolutions continue to reference self-determination, maintain neutrality regarding the final outcome, and call for negotiations without preconditions. Distinguishing between political endorsements and binding UN norms is therefore essential.

7. U.S. Bill H.R. 4119 (2025) Targeting the Polisario: Current Status

Media references to a potential “terrorist designation” of the Polisario Front require clarification. On June 24, 2025, a bipartisan bill (H.R. 4119 – Polisario Front Terrorist Designation Act) was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. It remains at the committee stage and has no legal force. It merely instructs the State Department to assess whether designation criteria are met. Presenting this initiative as a fait accompli is inaccurate and has no bearing on the applicable UN legal framework.

8. Human Rights and Governance: A Persistent UN Concern

Beyond status issues, the Security Council and the Secretary-General emphasize the humanitarian fragility of the region and the need for cooperation with the OHCHR, including through visits to the territory and refugee camps, and ensuring safe supply routes to MINURSO sites. The Secretary-General’s 2024 reports describe a volatile military situation since the 2020 ceasefire breakdown, advocating for de-escalation and a credible resumption of the political process under UN mediation.

9. A Way Forward: Principles for Breaking the Deadlock

Three principles, consistent with international law and UN practice, appear indispensable:

• Primacy of the UN framework: Relaunch negotiations under the Personal Envoy’s auspices, without preconditions, with Morocco and the Polisario Front as parties, and Algeria and Mauritania as neighboring states acting in good faith.
• Respect for the right to self-determination: Any mutually acceptable solution must ensure the Sahrawi people’s self-determination. Institutional models (including autonomy) are valid only if they result from free and genuine consent.
• Legal and economic safeguards: Any arrangement involving resources or economic agreements must comply with jurisprudence requiring the people’s consent—not merely that of the “population.”

Conclusion

Far from reflecting a “new realism,” the Western Sahara dossier remains firmly rooted in the principles of decolonization and self-determination. Security Council resolutions do not impose a single outcome; they demand a fair process based on compromise that allows the Sahrawi people to determine their final status. The CJEU reaffirmed in 2024 the legal consequences of the territory’s “separate and distinct” status. Bilateral positions and foreign legislative initiatives cannot override the UN framework. A lasting resolution requires moving beyond propaganda, returning to legal texts, and placing the will of the Sahrawi people at the center—the only compass compatible with the UN Charter.

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By Belgacem Merbah

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