The invasion of Ceuta, organized by the Moroccan regime, represented a genuine geopolitical earthquake. The episode surprised many observers and raised a fundamental question: why did Rabat choose to target Pedro Sánchez when he had arguably been its most valuable ally in Europe?
Since coming to power, Sánchez had multiplied concessions in favor of Morocco. On the diplomatic front, he carried out a historic shift in Spain's position on Western Sahara, breaking with decades of diplomatic caution. Economically, bilateral relations reached record levels, with a growing presence of Spanish companies in Morocco and an unprecedented expansion of trade between the two countries. Moroccan citizens also benefited from a number of specific advantages, particularly in the areas of mobility and administrative cooperation. No other country on the southern shore of the Mediterranean received such favorable treatment from Madrid.
And yet, despite all these advantages, Rabat chose confrontation.
Claiming that this invasion was organized by the Moroccan authorities is not merely speculative. The indications cited by supporters of this view are numerous and consistent. Images reportedly circulated showing military trucks transporting young Moroccans toward the Ceuta area. Moroccan security forces, usually highly visible along that border, were notably absent during the events. Even more striking, the barbed-wire barriers separating Moroccan territory from the Spanish enclave had allegedly been removed shortly before the crisis. Added to this are reports from several media outlets concerning intensified surveillance activities in the area in the days leading up to the crossing. Taken individually, each of these elements may be open to debate; taken together, however, they appear to form a pattern that is difficult to ignore.
Faced with these facts, some attempted to promote alternative explanations, including alleged networks directed from Algeria or the actions of human-smuggling groups. However, these explanations appear fragile to those who point to the numerous indications suggesting an operation facilitated, or even encouraged, by the Moroccan authorities themselves.
To understand this decision, one must examine the political logic attributed to the Moroccan regime. Since independence, Morocco has built a significant part of its strategic orientation around close alignment with major Western powers. Its economy remains heavily dependent on foreign capital, international financial institutions, and European partners. This dependence inevitably limits its strategic autonomy and, according to this interpretation, often pushes it to act in accordance with interests that sometimes extend beyond its own immediate national priorities.
At the same time, Pedro Sánchez gradually distinguished himself on several sensitive international issues. His recognition of the State of Palestine and certain positions related to tensions in the Middle East earned him the hostility of influential international actors. As a result, weakening Sánchez allegedly became an objective shared by various political forces, both inside and outside Spain.
According to this interpretation, the Ceuta crisis fits into that broader dynamic. By triggering a spectacular migration-related pressure on Spanish territory, Rabat allegedly knew it would place Sánchez in an extremely difficult political position. The Spanish right had long accused him of being too soft on Morocco, while parts of the left criticized his concessions regarding Western Sahara. Consequently, the operation seemed likely to further weaken a leader who was already facing growing criticism.
There is, however, a second and more pragmatic interpretation. According to analyst Akram Kharief, Rabat may have sought to send a direct message to the Spanish right. Moroccan leaders understand that the Sánchez era may be approaching its end and that Spain's political balance could change after future elections. By demonstrating their ability to generate a major crisis whenever they choose, they may have wished to remind future Spanish leaders that no stable relationship with Morocco can exist without prior negotiation with Rabat.
In other words, the Ceuta episode may not have been directed solely at Sánchez; it may also have served as a warning to those aspiring to succeed him. The message would be straightforward: the advantages obtained by Morocco under Sánchez should either be preserved or renegotiated under conditions favorable to Rabat.
However, this strategy carries a significant risk: overestimating Morocco's ability to exert pressure while underestimating Spain's own leverage.
Contrary to what some in Rabat may believe, the relationship of dependency is not one-sided. Spain is a vital partner for Morocco in the energy, trade, and financial sectors. Any reconsideration of strategic cooperation, particularly in electricity and natural gas, could have serious consequences for an economy that remains structurally dependent on external partners. Several key industries, including the phosphate sector, could be directly affected by a prolonged energy crisis.
Pedro Sánchez has so far chosen restraint. Other leaders, however, may make different choices. If a future Spanish government decides to defend its interests more firmly, Morocco could discover that confrontation with Madrid is far more costly than anticipated.
For this reason, the Ceuta crisis may ultimately be viewed as a short-term tactical success but a major long-term strategic mistake. In attempting to demonstrate its strength, Rabat may instead have revealed the real limits of its leverage in its relationship with Spain.
By Belgacem Merbah
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