The claim that Morocco does not serve as “Europe’s policeman” is difficult to reconcile with the facts. For more than a decade, the European Union has invested heavily in strengthening Morocco’s border-control capabilities, committing hundreds of millions of euros to migration management, with the overwhelming share directed toward security and surveillance mechanisms.
These funds are neither accidental nor philanthropic. They form part of a clearly acknowledged strategy of externalizing European migration control, making Morocco one of the central pillars of the continent’s policy of containing migratory flows before they reach European borders. Rabat has thus become an indispensable partner in a system whose primary purpose is to keep migratory pressure at a distance from Europe itself.
Algeria, by contrast, benefits from no comparable arrangement. It receives no European funding dedicated to border surveillance and has never agreed to delegate its migration policy to external interests. Algiers has chosen to manage this strategic issue independently, bearing alone the costs and responsibilities that come with it.
This difference reflects two fundamentally distinct approaches: on one hand, a closely financed partnership between Rabat and Brussels centered on migration management; on the other, an Algerian approach grounded in decision-making autonomy and the preservation of national sovereignty.
I. Official Denials Versus Financial Reality
The position advanced by the Moroccan government source quoted by Assahifa reflects a familiar communication strategy: denying the transactional nature of a relationship precisely when it has become most evident.
Arguing that European funding has “never been the driving force behind Morocco’s actions” ignores a well-documented financial structure. Morocco’s Ministry of the Interior itself estimates the annual cost of border control at nearly €100 million. Added to this national expenditure are substantial European allocations distributed through several programs: €500 million earmarked for migration cooperation during the 2021-2027 period, €152 million dedicated to strengthening border control under an agreement signed in 2023, and more than €170 million disbursed between 2020 and 2022 for surveillance systems.
Even more revealing, several analyses indicate that approximately 80% of these funds are directed toward security and migration-control measures rather than migrant integration or protection. In other words, what Brussels primarily finances is not a humanitarian policy, but a system of migration control and deterrence.
II. A Border Turned into a Diplomatic Instrument
The core issue, however, goes beyond the financial dimension alone.
In Morocco, the border is no longer merely an area to be monitored; it has become a political instrument that can be tightened or relaxed according to diplomatic circumstances.
Events from recent years reveal a striking continuity:
In 2019, the closure of the Fnideq commercial crossing, officially justified as a measure against smuggling, occurred amid tensions with Spain over the Western Sahara issue, causing significant economic consequences for local communities.
In May 2021, between 8,000 and 10,000 migrants crossed into Ceuta within a matter of hours after an apparent relaxation of Moroccan border controls, following Spain’s decision to host Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front. A few months later, Madrid carried out a dramatic diplomatic shift regarding the Sahara question.
In 2026, a new episode of migratory pressure affected the enclave of Ceuta against the backdrop of improving relations between Algiers and Madrid and the visit of the Spanish Prime Minister to Algeria.
Taken individually, each event may be interpreted in different ways. Taken together, however, they suggest a coherent pattern: the border appears not only as a service financed by Europe, but also as a negotiating tool that can be activated according to political circumstances.
The paradox is striking. Morocco is compensated for helping manage migratory flows while simultaneously retaining the ability to adjust the effectiveness of that control when its diplomatic interests require it. The border thus becomes both a source of revenue and an instrument of leverage.
III. The Algerian Exception
This logic stands in sharp contrast to Algeria’s approach.
Algeria has never integrated migration management into a relationship of financial dependence with the European Union. It receives no comparable compensation for monitoring its land and maritime borders and has never used migration flows as a means of diplomatic bargaining.
This choice naturally carries significant budgetary costs. It also deprives Algeria of the financial and political advantages associated with such partnerships. Yet it offers a crucial benefit: the preservation of strategic autonomy.
As a result, Algeria’s border-management policy remains determined exclusively by national priorities, without external conditionality and without dependence on a security-based rent periodically renegotiated with foreign partners.
IV. What the Official Narrative Carefully Avoids Addressing
By portraying Morocco’s migration partnership with the European Union as an unequal and unfavorable relationship, the official narrative tends to invert the reality of the balance of power.
The question is not merely whether Europe makes use of Morocco. It is also the fact that Morocco has turned its geographic position and migration-control role into a strategic asset that can be leveraged both financially and diplomatically.
Consequently, statements rejecting the label of “Europe’s policeman” appear less like a refutation of facts than an attempt to obscure a reality that has become increasingly difficult to contest: the existence of a structured interdependence in which European funding and migration leverage constitute two sides of the same mechanism.
Ultimately, the debate is no longer about whether this relationship exists, as its existence is extensively documented, but about how one chooses to describe it. Where some see a strategic partnership, others view it as the contractualization of a security function that Morocco monetizes vis-à-vis Europe while retaining the ability to transform it into a diplomatic lever whenever its interests require it.
Belgacem Merbah
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