Algeria-Spain: A Pragmatic Thaw, But Will Madrid Go So Far As to Correct Its Position on Western Sahara?

Pedro Sánchez's visit to Algiers unmistakably marks an important diplomatic sequence: after several years of open crisis between Algiers and Madrid, the head of the Spanish government came to display a desire for a "new momentum" with Algeria, centred on energy, investment, political dialogue, migration and economic cooperation. France 24 notes that this is Pedro Sánchez's first visit to Algeria in four years, coming after the crisis triggered in 2022 by Spain's support for Morocco's autonomy plan for Western Sahara.

1. The Return of Spanish Realism: Algeria Becomes Unavoidable Again

The first reading of this visit is straightforward: Madrid has understood that it could not afford, over the long term, a degraded relationship with Algiers. Algeria is not merely a neighbour on the southern shore of the Mediterranean; it is a major energy supplier, a central actor in regional security, a partner on migration, and an important market for Spanish companies. Pedro Sánchez himself acknowledged as much, describing Algeria as a "strategic partner" while stressing the need to deepen political dialogue and economic partnership.

This warming is therefore rooted first and foremost in a logic of interest. Since the start of 2026, Algeria has once again become Spain's leading supplier of natural gas, notably via the Medgaz pipeline, according to France 24. The presence in Algiers of executives from Spanish energy companies shows that Madrid is seeking not merely a symbolic détente, but a concrete, economic and energy-based normalisation.

 2. Western Sahara Remains the Political Crux of the Relationship

Yet the real underlying issue remains Western Sahara. It was precisely Spain's about-turn in March 2022 — when Madrid backed Morocco's autonomy plan as the basis for a settlement — that triggered the crisis with Algiers. France 24 recalls that this shift ended Spain's historic position of neutrality and led Algeria to suspend the friendship treaty concluded in 2002, along with trade restrictions with heavy consequences.

For Algiers, the Western Sahara question is not a simple regional dispute between two Maghreb neighbours. It falls under the heading of decolonisation, in line with United Nations doctrine, since the territory remains bound by the logic of the right to self-determination. MINURSO was created in 1991 to accompany a settlement process providing for a referendum that would allow the Sahrawi people to choose between independence and integration with Morocco.

3. Will Spain Officially Change Its Position?

In the short term, it seems unlikely that Pedro Sánchez will announce, head-on, an abandonment of the position adopted in 2022. Such a reversal would expose Madrid to a fresh crisis with Rabat, at a time when Spain also depends on its cooperation with Morocco over migration, security, Ceuta, Melilla, trade flows and the stability of the Strait of Gibraltar. Spain's 2022 position had been conceived precisely as a strategic rebalancing in Rabat's favour, following an intense Spanish-Moroccan crisis.

However, Spain can shift its posture without necessarily changing its doctrine officially. This is probably where the diplomatic manoeuvre lies: Madrid could avoid publicly repeating its support for the Moroccan plan, return to more cautious language, and place greater emphasis on the United Nations framework, international law, and the need for a mutually acceptable political solution. In other words, Spain might not "renounce" its 2022 position, but could progressively dilute it within more balanced language.

4. The Most Likely Scenario: A Constructive Ambiguity

The most credible scenario, then, is one of calculated ambiguity. Madrid will not officially declare: "We are withdrawing our support for the Moroccan plan." But it could stop treating it as a top diplomatic marker. This would allow Sánchez to manage the relationship with Rabat while reassuring Algiers. Such a line would also allow Spain to partially return to its historic diplomatic tradition: remaining committed to the UN process without appearing to be the political auxiliary of a single party.

This ambiguity is all the more likely given that, according to elements reported by France 24, Tebboune and Sánchez did discuss Western Sahara during their meeting, though the political messaging placed the emphasis chiefly on energy, the economy, investment and bilateral dialogue. This suggests that both capitals want to contain the Sahrawi disagreement so that it no longer blocks the relationship as a whole.

5. Has Algiers Won a Diplomatic Victory?

Yes, partially. The mere fact that Pedro Sánchez travelled to Algiers after the 2022 crisis already constitutes an implicit acknowledgment of Algeria's weight. Madrid has understood that it could not build a lasting Maghreb policy by aligning excessively with Rabat at Algiers' expense. The announced reactivation of the friendship treaty and the gradual thawing of trade relations since 2025 confirm that Spain is seeking to repair the diplomatic damage caused by its 2022 reversal.

But this victory should not be overestimated. Algiers has not yet secured any official Spanish retreat on Western Sahara. Spain appears instead to be seeking normalisation without public repentance. In short: Madrid wants to regain Algiers' trust, but without breaking with Rabat. It is a balancing act, inherently fragile, since it rests on a difficult double promise: reassuring Algeria without alarming Morocco.

6. Spanish Interests Are Pushing Toward Algiers

Over the medium term, several factors could push Spain to rebalance its position further. The first is energy-related: Algeria holds considerable leverage, especially in a European context where security of supply remains strategic. The second is economic: Spanish companies have an interest in fully regaining the Algerian market after the trade restrictions linked to the 2022 crisis. The third is geopolitical: Spain cannot allow France, Italy or Germany to occupy the space of partnership with Algiers alone.

The fourth factor is internal to Spain. Sánchez's position on Western Sahara was contested by part of the Spanish political class, partly because it broke with a tradition of caution and appeared to have been decided in a highly unilateral manner. This internal political fragility could, over time, open the way to a correction should the parliamentary or governmental balance of power in Spain shift.

7. What Algeria Can Expect From Madrid

Algeria can probably obtain three things from Spain. First, a lasting resumption of strategic dialogue, with regular mechanisms for consultation. Second, denser economic cooperation: energy, renewables, infrastructure, industry, agriculture, services and the movement of people. Finally, a degree of Spanish restraint on Western Sahara, with a gradual return to language more in line with the UN framework.

By contrast, it would be unrealistic to expect, in the immediate term, a spectacular statement from Madrid cancelling that of 2022. Spanish diplomacy will advance through successive shifts, not through an abrupt rupture. The most likely outcome is a policy of "quiet disalignment": less public enthusiasm for the Moroccan thesis, more references to the United Nations, but without direct confrontation with Rabat.

Conclusion: Toward a Conditional Normalisation, Not Yet a Full Reconciliation

The future of Algerian-Spanish relations will depend on Madrid's capacity to grasp a fundamental reality: Algiers will not accept being treated as a mere gas supplier while Spain politically endorses Moroccan theses on Western Sahara. The relationship with Algeria demands consistency, strategic respect, and a degree of equidistance on sensitive regional matters.

Spain will probably not officially change its position overnight. But it could gradually correct it in practice. And perhaps that is where the essential is really at stake: not in a spectacular declaration, but in a gradual evolution of language, priorities and balances. If Madrid genuinely wants to rebuild a solid relationship with Algiers, it will sooner or later have to recognise that Western Sahara cannot be reduced to a diplomatic transaction with Rabat. It is a matter of international law, of Spain's colonial memory, and of the self-determination of a people whose fate has remained suspended for nearly half a century.

Belgacem Merbah