Morocco's strategic shock: when the illusion of Western protection clashes with geopolitical realities
For several decades, Morocco has made a clear strategic choice: to anchor its military and security doctrine within the Western system. Rabat has thus invested heavily in interoperability with NATO armies, multiplied military cooperation agreements with the United States and European powers, and, more recently, deepened its security and technological cooperation with Israel.
This orientation was not merely a policy of military modernization. It rested on a fundamental strategic assumption: integration into the Western security architecture would offer Morocco a form of implicit protection in the event of a major crisis.
However, recent geopolitical developments in the Middle East—particularly the tensions linked to the confrontation with Iran—have begun to shake this conviction in several regional capitals.
The Gulf precedent: costly but limited alliances
The Gulf monarchies have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in their strategic relations with the United States. They have hosted major American military bases and signed massive arms contracts with the U.S. defense industry.
Yet, in the face of escalating regional tensions, one reality has gradually become clear: the United States’ strategic priority in the Middle East remains above all the security of Israel, even though Washington maintains close partnerships with several Arab states.
This observation has led certain political and strategic elites in the region to question the true nature of American security guarantees. Military alliances and colossal investments in relations with Washington do not necessarily translate into an automatic commitment of U.S. military intervention in the event of a major conflict.
Questions emerging in Morocco
These reflections now resonate in Morocco. Some Moroccan political figures have publicly raised the limits of strategic dependence on major powers.
Former Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane recently recalled a warning issued decades ago by former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, who explained that states believing they are automatically protected by the United States could be gravely mistaken.
This remark points to a simple yet fundamental question: if major regional powers such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, endowed with considerable economic weight in their relations with Washington, are discovering the limits of American protection, what real guarantee can a country with more limited strategic and economic weight expect?
A security model based on alliances
For many years, Morocco has worked to strengthen its position as a privileged partner of the West. This strategy has materialized through:
- close military cooperation with the United States;
- regular participation in joint military exercises;
- security agreements with several Western countries;
- military and technological rapprochement with Israel.
The objective was clear: to reinforce Morocco’s military capacities while embedding the kingdom’s security within a network of international alliances.
But the history of international relations repeatedly reminds us of a fundamental truth: alliances do not automatically translate into direct intervention when the vital interests of major powers are not at stake.
The military imbalance in North Africa in Algeria’s favor
In this context, the issue of the military balance in the Maghreb emerges as a central challenge. In the event of a major regional crisis, the evolution of power dynamics would depend first and foremost on national capabilities, far more than on hypothetical external support.
Algeria, in this regard, possesses a structured and well-equipped military apparatus embodied by the National People’s Army (ANP). According to several specialized rankings and assessments, it regularly appears among the most powerful forces in North Africa. In a scenario of open confrontation, this capability advantage would weigh heavily on the outcome of operations.
For many analysts, this reality confirms a constant principle: regional stability depends primarily on the internal strength of states—on their organization, resources, and strategic autonomy—rather than on often-uncertain promises of external support.
A possible strategic inflection?
Given the current balance of power, it is increasingly difficult to ignore that the military advantage clearly leans toward Algeria. And this is precisely where the heart of the problem lies: when reality asserts itself, it forces narratives to adjust and ambitions to reckon with their consequences. Several observers thus believe that Rabat will be compelled—sooner or later—to revise its strategic objectives, especially where maximalist options lead to a dead end: expansionist postures, rhetorical escalation, or hardening on the Western Sahara issue.
Such an inflection, if confirmed, could lead part of the Moroccan elite to reconsider assumptions that have become not only costly but also frankly counterproductive.
The era has changed. The reshaping of the international order reminds us of a harsh truth often conveniently forgotten: great powers protect only their interests, and implicit “guarantees”—those half-spoken promises and expectations of external support—often prove more fragile than glass under stress. The umbrella is never assured; it folds the moment the winds of vital interests blow.
In this context, many analysts argue that Maghreb stability will be built neither on the illusion of distant patrons nor on a policy of fait accompli, but on a lucid, pragmatic approach aligned with core principles:
- de-escalation and the effective reduction of regional tensions;
- deeper, smarter, mutually beneficial economic cooperation;
- respect for international law and decolonization processes, without distortions or indefinite postponement.
History does not lie: the lasting security of states rests less on uncertain alliances than on regional stability, a minimum of trust between neighbors, and a strategic balance managed with composure over time.
A cautionary note for Algeria
Yet taking a step back, Algeria—precisely because it understands the grammar of power relations—must not allow itself to be lulled by a potential Moroccan “outstretched hand” at the very moment when this strategic inflection reshuffles the cards. Morocco has too often demonstrated a preference for tactical maneuvers rather than substantive commitments.
The example of 1991 remains vivid: when Rabat was weakened, commitments were brandished regarding a referendum in Western Sahara; everyone later saw what they were worth, as the referendum never took place and the promises made were not honored.
Therefore, Algeria would be wise to use this balance of power not to fall for illusions, but to secure a serious, lasting, and lawful settlement. It should aim for a definitive outcome through credible, verifiable, and irreversible mechanisms—not through promises without guarantees.
For in strategic affairs, naïveté is costly: one must listen to signals, read actions, and never confuse momentary opportunism with genuine transformation. Declared “repentances” bind only those who believe them; only commitments fulfilled carry real weight.
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