The Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (GME) was never a mere technical installation. For a quarter of a century, it functioned as an energy bridge between Algeria, Morocco, and the Iberian Peninsula, demonstrating that a pipeline can continue to operate even when political relations deteriorate. Commissioned on November 1, 1996, the GME was conceived as early as 1990, built between 1993 and 1996, and continued to operate despite the closure of the Algerian–Moroccan land borders in 1994.
What occurred in 2021, however, marked a true turning point: Algeria stopped treating gas as a so‑called “tool of cooperation” and restored it to what it has always fundamentally been—an instrument governed by cost, sovereignty, and deterrence.
1) The origins: a European project… with Morocco in a rent‑seeking position
Initially, the GME served a clear objective: to transport Algerian gas to Spain and Portugal via Morocco and the Strait of Gibraltar. Stretching approximately 1,300 km, the pipeline was presented as a technical and economic achievement and as a structuring Euro‑Mediterranean axis.
Within this architecture, Morocco enjoyed a strategic advantage: being a transit country always generates a rent—financial, political, and energy‑related. Over time, the history of the GME entrenched in Rabat the belief that it could benefit from a flow it did not produce.
2) October 31, 2021: end of the contract, end of illusions
3) The bypass that changed everything: Medgaz, the direct route that neutralized Morocco’s leverage
The cornerstone of the new setup is Medgaz, a subsea gas pipeline linking Béni Saf (Algeria) directly to Almería (Spain), in operation since 2011.
4) “Reverse flow”: Rabat did not “find a solution”, it changed its dependency
From late June 2022, the GME was reactivated in reverse flow. Morocco began purchasing LNG on international markets, regasifying it in Spain, and injecting it into the pipeline toward Morocco. Spain confirmed this mechanism from the outset.
This allowed Morocco to resume supply to its gas‑fired power plants via the Morocco–Spain gas interconnection in reverse mode. But this must not be misread: this is not energy autonomy, but a reconfigured dependency. Rabat is now reliant on Spanish LNG terminals, network capacity, and the political and technical choices of an EU member state.
5) The real objective: pay gas at “full market price” and dismantle a competitive advantage
Contrary to the propagandistic narrative claiming “we replaced Algerian gas,” the problem was never the physical availability of an alternative molecule. The real issue lies in price, volatility, and macroeconomic impact.
By cutting the GME on its side, Algeria removed Morocco’s access to gas that had long been perceived as a competitiveness factor. Moroccan supply now relies far more on LNG purchases and a logistics chain that is costlier and more exposed to global cycles.
That is precisely where the move was surgical: Algeria did not need to deprive Morocco entirely—it only had to remove the advantage, ensuring that energy would no longer function as an easy competitive lever.
6) Electricity: when gas reaches inflation and industry (not just power plants)
Gas feeds directly into Morocco’s electricity system, particularly via the Tahaddart combined‑cycle gas plant, which produced 6% of Morocco’s distributed electricity in 2019 and remains a cornerstone of the national energy mix.
At Aïn Beni Mathar, the national utility (ONEE) refers to a project capable of injecting nearly 1,590 GWh per year into the interconnected grid, linked to the GME—illustrating the structural entanglement between this pipeline and Morocco’s power balance.
When energy becomes more expensive or uncertain, the impact does not remain contained. It spreads to production costs, prices, and therefore inflation. This is not rhetoric, but the classic mechanics of an economy highly dependent on imported energy.
7) Importing electricity from Spain: the symptom of vulnerability (even when it seems “advantageous”)
Following 2021–2022, Morocco significantly increased its electricity exchanges with Spain. Multiple sources indicate a sharp rise in Moroccan imports of Spanish electricity—up to 1,512 GWh during the last seven months of 2022, with periods of heavy stress on the interconnection.
Some analyses point out that Spain’s price‑cap mechanism (the so‑called “Iberian exception”) temporarily made imported electricity relatively attractive. Paradoxically, this reinforces the core point: Morocco became dependent on a Spanish energy policy adjustment.
In other words, even when prices appear manageable, the reality is clear: Rabat is not merely buying kilowatt‑hours—it is buying dependency. And in geopolitics, dependency always comes at a cost sooner or later.
8) The strategic trap: Morocco under Spanish—and European—arbitration
One reality Rabat cannot circumvent is that Spain is an EU member state, bound by a supply‑security framework and reinforced energy solidarity mechanisms. In crisis situations, the EU prioritizes consumer protection and internal solidarity.
In the event of a major supply shock—geopolitical tension, LNG price spikes, or intra‑European competition for capacity—Spanish infrastructure decisions (LNG terminals, networks, interconnections) will inevitably prioritize national and European interests. This is Morocco’s vulnerability: lacking equivalent domestic regasification capacity and depending on an external “service.”
9) “Secret negotiations” Algeria–Morocco over the GME? A useful myth… but not a credible one
Let us be clear: the GME still exists on the Moroccan–Spanish side and operates in reverse flow, with maintenance and operation publicly described by industry players.
However, a return to the previous model—Algerian gas transiting through Morocco—would require a political decision by Algeria to recreate an advantage in favor of a neighbor it considers hostile. Everything publicly observable since 2021 instead points in the opposite direction: Algeria consolidated the direct route (Medgaz) and fully accepted the end of transit.
Yes, rumors may serve to reassure public opinion and sell the idea of an “imminent return.” But strategic logic is cold: a geopolitical concession does not return once the relationship is broken.
Conclusion — Algiers’ message: “Treating Algeria as an enemy has a price”
Ultimately, the closure of the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline cannot be framed as a technical problem or a temporary mishap. It was a clear and deliberate political signal, marking the end of a situation in which Morocco benefited—directly or indirectly—from an energy advantage inherited from a time when economics and geopolitics were conveniently kept apart.
Since then, Rabat can still source gas on international markets. But it does so through a costlier and more fragile supply chain, via obligatory passage through Spain, and with heightened vulnerability to tensions in European gas markets or transport and regasification capacity. That was precisely the point Algeria intended to make: a hostile posture has a cost, and that cost is far from abstract. It manifests in eroded competitiveness, new structural vulnerabilities, and displaced energy dependencies.
It is therefore surprising to see certain Moroccan commentators speculate about alleged revenue losses for Algeria following the GME’s shutdown. Such interpretations are based on superficial analysis and ignore the underlying economic realities.
By ending transit through the GME, Algeria stopped paying transit fees to Morocco and halted the sale of gas under preferential conditions far removed from market prices. Together, these factors represent substantial savings, estimated at around one billion dollars per year.
Moreover, the volumes previously carried by pipeline were not lost. They were redirected toward liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports—a structurally more profitable segment. Unlike pipeline gas constrained by long‑term contracts with relatively rigid pricing, LNG offers greater commercial flexibility and higher valuation on global markets, mechanically increasing Algerian export revenues.
Added to this is a decisive logistical advantage: Algeria owns its own LNG carrier fleet, allowing it to capture the added value of maritime transport as well. The benefit is therefore twofold—economic, through better resource valuation, and strategic, through control of the entire logistics chain.
In short, rather than indulging in imprecise speculation about Algeria’s supposed gains or losses, some observers would be better served by focusing on the structural energy imbalances facing their own country. That is where the real economic and strategic stakes lie—not in narratives designed to obscure a reality that has become increasingly difficult to contest.
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