Fourteen years after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, Libya remains mired in chronic political fragmentation. Far from regaining institutional stability, the country continues to be governed by a logic of militias, local clientelism, and foreign interference. The Libyan conflict has become entrenched, turning Tripoli into a permanent theatre of power struggles. The recent events of May 2025 highlight the extreme fragility of the capital’s politico-military equilibrium, particularly through the assassination of powerful militia leader Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, known as “Ghneiwa,” and the chain reaction it set off.
1. Militia-Based Governance Rooted in State Collapse
Since 2011, Libya has lacked a functioning state in the institutional sense. Public institutions are severely weakened, if not altogether absent, and sovereignty is effectively divided among armed groups. In Tripoli, security has for years relied on an implicit coexistence among militia factions, whose authority is grounded more in coercion and threat than in legitimacy or law. This model, based on mutual tolerance among “warlords,” had allowed for a semblance of stability—albeit at the cost of deep political stagnation.
2. Ghneiwa: From Common Criminal to De Facto State Actor
Abdel Ghani al-Kikli personified the fusion of militia power and public authority. Once a petty criminal, he rose to lead the Stability Support Authority (SSA), becoming a central pillar in Tripoli’s security apparatus. His militia, numbering in the thousands, effectively controlled the strategic district of Abu Salim, where it exercised near-sovereign authority—running its own prison system, enforcing its own laws, and operating parallel influence networks.
This rise would not have been possible without a functional relationship with the official state. Successive governments—especially that of Abdelhamid Dbeibah—institutionalized this mutual dependency: in return for his loyalty, Ghneiwa was granted key positions within security and migration agencies, thereby consolidating both his military clout and his economic interests.
3. The Breaking Point: A Targeted Operation and Its Fallout
May 12, 2025, marked a dramatic turning point. A military operation launched by the 444 Brigade, with Dbeibah’s backing, explicitly aimed to neutralize Ghneiwa and reclaim control over Abu Salim. The swift strike succeeded in eliminating the militia leader, causing his network to disintegrate rapidly. Yet, rather than stabilizing the situation, this maneuver triggered a broader escalation.
Armed groups from Misrata, Zawiya, and Zintan—historically sidelined or excluded from this show of force—interpreted it as an attempt to unilaterally reshape the balance of power in the capital. Regional militias mobilized, threatening to turn the initial confrontation into a new urban war. Chaos ensued: street fighting, school and business closures, and the paralysis of civilian life.
4. A Government on the Defensive: The Limits of a Security Gamble
The Dbeibah government appears to have wagered on eliminating an inconvenient power broker to reassert itself as a central actor in national politics. However, this strategy clashed with the complexity of Libya’s political landscape. The anticipated political gain from the operation was quickly undermined by the unpredictable reshuffling of militia alliances. The political vacuum became evident: the government no longer governs—it defends itself.
5. The Specter of a Nationally Violent Recomposition
The current crisis transcends Tripoli. It signals an ongoing national-level reconfiguration of political and military dynamics. Ghneiwa’s fall presents an opportunity for various actors to reposition themselves ahead of the long-anticipated formation of a new unified government, championed by the international community. This acute moment of instability reveals persistent fractures among revolutionary factions, former militias-turned-business elites, and the tribal structures of western Libya.
6. A Regional Arena in Waiting: Strategic Inertia or Tactical Repositioning?
As Tripoli wavers, the eastern region remains watchful. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has not intervened directly, but his allies have quietly deployed near the capital. This wait-and-see posture may allow him to present himself as a “rational” fallback solution if chaos spreads. Meanwhile, Turkey—Dbeibah’s longstanding backer—appears increasingly hesitant, uncomfortable with the internal rivalries of the camp it once supported. Should Ankara withdraw its support, the collapse of central authority would likely accelerate.
7. Conclusion: The End of a Political Cycle
What is crumbling in Tripoli is not merely a militia leader or a fragile government, but an entire model of power management built on negotiated violence and rent distribution. This system—tolerated and sometimes encouraged by the international community in the absence of viable alternatives—has reached its breaking point. The tacit rules that previously structured armed coexistence have ceased to function.
The Libyan population, increasingly disillusioned, no longer harbors illusions about the prospect of a credible electoral process. The country stands at a crossroads: either a controlled transition toward a new balance—via political or military means—or a descent into a renewed phase of disintegration.
Timeline of Events (May 2025)
• May 12: Ghneiwa assassinated by the 444 Brigade. Clashes erupt in Tripoli. The government urges civilians to remain indoors.
• May 13: Militias from Misrata and elsewhere mobilize. Shops and schools close. Partial government reshuffle.
• May 14: Ceasefire announced. Fighting subsides, but tensions persist.
• May 15: Clashes resume. Red Crescent recovers bodies.
• May 16: Relative calm reported, though the situation remains unstable.
By Belgacem Merbah
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